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ABSTRACT
User identification plays a pivotal role in how we interact
with our mobile devices. Many existing authentication ap-
proaches require active input from the user or specialized
sensing hardware, and studies on mobile device usage show
significant interest in less inconvenient procedures. In this
paper, we propose EchoLock, a low effort identification scheme
that validates the user by sensing hand geometry via com-
modity microphones and speakers. These acoustic signals
produce distinct structure-borne sound reflections when con-
tacting the user’s hand, which can be used to differentiate
between different people based on how they hold their mo-
bile devices. We process these reflections to derive unique
acoustic features in both the time and frequency domain,
which can effectively represent physiological and behavioral
traits, such as hand contours, finger sizes, holding strength,
and gesture. Furthermore, learning-based algorithms are de-
veloped to robustly identify the user under various environ-
ments and conditions. We conduct extensive experiments
with 20 participants using different hardware setups in key
use case scenarios and study various attack models to demon-
strate the performance of our proposed system. Our results
show that EchoLock is capable of verifying users with over
90% accuracy, without requiring any active input from the
user.
1. INTRODUCTION
User identification is a fundamental and pervasive as-
pect of modern mobile device usage, both as a means of
maintaining security and personalized services. Verify-
ing oneself is necessary to gain access to smartphones,
bank accounts, and customized news feeds; informa-
tion and resources which must be available on demand.
As such, repeated acts of authentication can quickly
grow tedious and consume unnecessarily long portions
of daily routines involving mobile devices. Studies on
cellphone addiction suggest that user identification pro-
cedures encompass up to 9.0% of daily usage time [17],
with related inquiries showing strong interest in more
convenient practices [37]. Techniques such as facial recog-
nition or fingerprinting provide fast validation without
Figure 1: Capture of hand biometric informa-
tion embedded in structure-borne sound using
commodity microphones and speakers.
requiring considerable effort from the user, but demand
dedicated hardware components that may not be avail-
able on all devices. This is of particular importance in
markets of developing countries, where devices such as
the Huawei IDEOS must forgo multiple utilities in or-
der to maintain affordable price points (e.g. under $80)
[13, 15]. Secure and effective functionality necessitates
a lightweight protocol to distinguish between different
users, both to facilitate intelligently tailored services as
well as maintain privacy.
To this end, we propose EchoLock, an original and
inexpensive technique capable of secure, fast, and low-
effort user identification utilizing only commodity speak-
ers and microphones. EchoLock uses a carefully de-
signed inaudible signal to measure acoustic reflections
and structural vibrations produced by the user’s hand
when holding their mobile devices, such as smartphones,
tablets, smart remotes, or wireless mouses. Sound waves
produced by speakers propagate through physical medi-
ums such as the aforementioned devices in the form of
structure-borne sound. Pressure from the hand applied
to the device has a unique and observable impact on
structure-borne sound propagation. This information
is representative of the user’s hand geometry, a biomet-
ric indicator well studied in medical fields and known
to be accurate [7], yet rarely employed in mobile ap-
plications due to obstacles in obtaining accurate mea-
surements with limited hardware. We find that acous-
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tic sensing of these characteristics is not only feasible,
but also low-effort as no conscious action is required
by the user; holding the device itself is the validating
action, rather than typing a password or pressing a fin-
gerprint scanner, as shown in Figure 1. This can be
achieved using only speakers and microphones found on
most commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) devices, making
our system non-intrusive and low cost. The availability
of these hardware components is only expected to in-
crease with the rising prevalence of integrated IoT de-
vices built with virtual assistants and voice controllers,
projected to reach an install base of over 75 billion by
2025 [4].
Existing solutions in the market are typically consid-
ered effective and fast, but do have some limitations
regarding ease of use. Actions such as password en-
try, voice utterances, or finger presses demand, however
briefly, the user’s attention and active participation in
the process. In contrast, EchoLock is a passive pro-
cedure. Our technique serves as a viable standalone
identification system, or as a complementary system for
multi-factor authentication due to its naturally low in-
volvement. Password security, for example, can be en-
hanced by simultaneously sampling hand geometry dur-
ing typing or swiping actions, compensating for com-
mon vulnerabilities (e.g. PIN codes spied on through
shoulder-surfing attacks cannot be used if the attacker’s
hand is not recognized by the device).
As a standalone technique, EchoLock is applicable
to a wide variety of services. Resources such as finan-
cial accounts or health apps on smartphones can trig-
ger a single-instance identification check to verify the
user’s hand before divulging sensitive information. Pri-
vate message notifications can be displayed or hidden
onscreen depending on which person is currently hold-
ing the device. The low costs of small-scale microphone
and speaker sensors can enable even unconventional de-
vices to be compatible with EchoLock. Door handles
augmented with such components can passively sense
structure-borne sound propagation as the user holds
them and open or lock accordingly. The speed of sound
propagation is rapid, even when traveling through phys-
ical mediums, enabling our identification checks to be
completed within milliseconds. Continuous authenti-
cation can also be implemented via periodic measure-
ments.
Building EchoLock for such applications does present
many challenges, however. The most prominent is the
challenge in leveraging a single pair of low-fidelity speaker
and microphones to capture the unique characteristics
of a user’s hand geometry, which usually has only minute
differences between people. In addition, the acoustic
signal propagating from the device’s speaker to its mi-
crophone usually experiences multipath effect, resulting
in airborne and structure-borne signals that are hard
to distinguish from each other. Moreover, the ambi-
ent noises and acoustic signals reflected off surrounding
obstacles create serious interference that needs to be
accounted for. Last but not least, many factors could
impact the robustness of the proposed approach, such
as different device shapes or materials.
To address these challenges, EchoLock utilizes an ul-
trasonic signal to sense a user’s mannerisms when hold-
ing a device. A high-frequency, short duration trans-
mission is selected to reduce audible disturbances to the
user and provide prompt validation. The signals coming
through the structure-born and near-surface airborne
propagation are separated based on different sound speeds
in the air and solid materials [5]. The system applies a
band-pass filter to remove the ambient acoustic noises
that do not share the same spectrum as the designated
ultrasonic signal. We derive fine-grained acoustic fea-
tures, including statistic features in the time and fre-
quency domain as well as MFCC features, to capture
the unique hand holding biometrics. We find simple
learning-based algorithms (i.e., SVM and LDA) are suf-
ficient to robustly identify the user considering various
impact factors. There is no dependence on specialized
cameras or other dedicated hardware to accomplish this,
requiring only the use of readily accessible microphones
and speakers found on most modern mobile devices.
Most significantly, no active input is required from the
user, making our system low effort.
Our main contributions in this work are as follows:
• We develop a low-effort user identification system
for mobile and smart handheld devices (e.g. smart-
phones, smart remotes, wireless mouses) that vali-
dates hand biometric information based on acous-
tic sensing. The proposed system does not require
any input from the user and is non-invasive by uti-
lizing a inaudible frequencies. Moreover, our min-
imal hardware requirements make our system easy
to be deployed on most COTS devices.
• We design an acoustic sensing-based approach to
study the unique signal interferences caused by
an individual’s hand on sound propagation result-
ing from their different curvatures, finger sizes and
holding behavior. We demonstrate that structure-
born sound propagation of a carefully designed
acoustic signal is able to carry physiological and
behavioral hand information, which previously re-
lied on imaging techniques to measure.
• We identify unique acoustic features, including time-
domain, frequency domain, and MFCC features,
to capture the user’s biometrics and apply signal
processing and learning-based methods to distin-
guish the users based on their phone-holding be-
haviors for user identification.
• We implemented an early prototype of EchoLock
on various mobile devices and evaluated perfor-
mance under multiple conditions. Our tests in-
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volving over 160 trials of key use case scenarios
show identification accuracy upwards of 90%.
2. RELATED WORK
Reconciling the trade-off of accuracy and usability is
a constant challenge of user identification for mobile
devices. The most popular identification methods are
based on memorization of a text or numerical string
(e.g., a password and PIN) [33]. For these methods, the
user must either commit to memory complex knowl-
edge (e.g., random characters or long combinations), or
settle for a simpler string at the expense of security.
Graph-based authentication, such as lock patterns [36]
and image-based authentications [31, 12], are proposed
to ease the mental burden. They identify a user by ask-
ing the user to swipe line segments across multiple grid
points or recognize the user’s pre-selected image from
a sequence of randomly displayed pictures. However,
these approaches require more time to input graphical
patterns compared to the entry of alphanumerical pass-
words. Moreover, all these knowledge-based credentials
are subject to loss and have low security.
To relieve the burdens of user input (e.g., memoriza-
tion and input time) during identification, mobile de-
vices tend to adopt biometric-based approaches, which
allow the users to simply use physical traits of a body
part as credentials. Several popular examples include
face ID [1], capacitive fingerprint scanning [10, 2], and
iris scanning [3]. These physical traits are typically
unique to a person and do not change abruptly over
time, making them ideal for identifying purposes. How-
ever, these approaches require expensive or dedicated
hardware components to obtain users’ physiological char-
acteristics, which limits the deployment of these meth-
ods on most devices. Moreover, researchers show that
voices or faces are faster to input than passwords and
gestures, but users spend over 5s on average to respond
to the system with an active input in addition to the au-
thentication processing time, which is not convenient [32].
Human behaviors are considered another type of bio-
metrics that can be used for identification. Because
they usually encompass traits that are exhibited sub-
consciously, they are difficult to be stolen or imitated.
For example, existing works show that it is possible to
identify a user based on finger gestures on the touch
screen [28, 29, 26], hand gestures in the air [20], finger
input on any solid surface [21], or voice commands [38,
18]. While these approaches are low-cost, they also
pose a challenge for identification due to a high level
of variability when measuring these behaviors with low-
fidelity sensors available on mobile devices. Moreover,
behavioral-based identification still requires the user to
actively input a behavior pattern, which is still not con-
venient for frequent device unlocking activities.
There is active research on low-effort passive user au-
thentication, which we consider to be the closest cat-
Speaker
Structure Path
Airborne Path 
Bottom Mic (Mic B)
Top Mic (Mic A)
Figure 2: Example sensor configuration and
sound paths for a typical smartphone design.
egory of works to EchoLock. Ren et al. derive the
unique gait patterns from the user’s walking behav-
ior to passively verify the user’s identity by using ac-
celerometer readings in mobile devices [25]. Zheng et
al. propose to extract the user’s behavioral patterns of
touchscreen tapping (e.g., rhythm, strength, and angle
preferences of the applied force) from the device’s built-
in accelerometer, gyroscope, and touchscreen sensor to
provide non-intrusive user authentication [39] when the
device is in the unlocked status.
We summarize these findings in Table 1. Different
from other approaches, EchoLock utilizes novel hand-
related physiological biometrics (e.g. hand contours,
palm size, and finger dimensions) and behavioral bio-
metrics (e.g. holding strength and behavior) to provide
convenient and secure user authentication on mobile de-
vices. In particular, we perform fine-grained acoustic
sensing (i.e. using the near ultrasound emanations of
the mobile device) to capture the unique characteris-
tics of a user’s holding hand for identification. Acoustic
sensing is an emerging technique that has been widely
used in many mobile computing applications (e.g., in-
door localization [34], computer-human interaction [35,
30]) because it is easy to obtain and process the acous-
tic signals in mobile devices. To our best knowledge, we
are the first work to utilize acoustic sensing to capture
biometric information for low effort user identification.
Our proposed technique does not depend on personally
identifiable information, active user inputs, long input
time, or specialized hardware.
3. FEASIBILITY STUDY
3.1 Sound Propagation on Mobile Devices
Acoustic sensing techniques may vary depending on
the transmission medium sound propagates through.
Figure 2 illustrates this using an example diagram of
a common configuration format for speaker and micro-
phone placement on a COTS smartphone. Many mobile
devices are equipped with at least two microphones, po-
sitioned opposite of each other at either ends of the de-
3
Table 1: Qualitative comparison of existing user identification methods.
Identification
Technique
Evaluation
Category
Personally
Identifiable
Physiological
Credentials
Behavioral
Credentials
Specialized
Hardware
Lockscreen Image [11] Knowledge No No Yes No
Face [14] Visual Yes Yes No No
Fingerprint [23] Visual Yes Yes No Yes
Iris [8] Visual Yes Yes No Yes
Gait [40] Visual No Yes Yes No
Voice [19] Acoustic Yes Yes Yes No
Our Work (EchoLock) Acoustic No Yes Yes No
(a) Held in hand (b) Idle on table (c) Stored in pocket
Figure 3: Testing conditions for preliminary en-
vironmental differentiation experiments.
vice. Sound sources, such as speakers of the mobile de-
vice, produce acoustic signals, which follow an airborne
propagation path to be received by the microphones.
For structure-borne propagation, however, the trans-
mission medium is the device itself. This form of sound
is most often recognized as vibration and can be per-
ceived both aurally as well as tangibly, due to the na-
ture of the medium. From Hooke’s Law [27], the speed
of sound through a medium can be represented as a
function, formulated as c =
√
K
p where K is the bulk
modulus of elasticity, or Young’s modulus, and p is the
medium density. As seen in Figure 2, the structure path
is more direct due to the greater density and compres-
sion resistance of the mobile device, allowing sound to
travel and be received more quickly compared to in the
air. This trait is of interest as propagation through a
physical medium provides natural resilience to reflec-
tions from distant obstacles as there is minimal devia-
tion from the sound path.
A caveat to this, however, is that structure-borne
propagation is much more sensitive to physical distur-
bances. Interactions such as touching the medium can
significantly alter the acoustic patterns as the contact
and force exerted upon the medium changes how it re-
verberates. While this normally poses a challenge for
acute acoustic sensing, EchoLock exploits this for the
purposes of recognizing individual people. The force
of a user’s grip on the mobile device is integral to the
system, essentially extending the medium to encompass
both the device and user’s hand. The bulk modulus of
elasticity can be expressed as:
K =
−(p1 − p0)
(V1 − V0)/V0 =
∆P
∆V/V0
, (1)
Figure 4: Euclidean distance of signal ampli-
tudes recorded from different use case scenarios.
Lower distances imply signal similarities.
for a given differential change in pressure ∆P and vol-
ume ∆V relative to an initial volume V0. The introduc-
tion of a stable additive density V1 and fluctuating pres-
sure increase p1 by the user changes K to a dynamic set
of elasticity constants. This produces a range of acous-
tic patterns representative of how the device is held by a
specific individual at the time of measurement, uniquely
shaped by hand contour, posture, grip pressure, and be-
havior. Note that this model is an incomplete explana-
tion as it does not account for a distributed application
of pressure from different focal points of a user’s hand.
However, based on our observations, this explanation
is sufficient for the purposes of conveying the intuition
behind EchoLock ’s functionality.
3.2 Structure-borne Propagation Feasibility
To establish the capabilities of structure-borne sound
propagation, a simple preliminary experiment was per-
formed to gauge the ability for a mobile device to as-
certain environmental conditions using acoustic sens-
ing. The observations from this experiment shaped the
design of EchoLock and provided insight into imple-
mentation feasibility and potential design challenges.
Three different use cases were selected with the intent
of demonstrating that conditions with distinct forces
exerted upon the mobile device could be easily recog-
nized. Figure 3 shows the particular experimental setup
for each the three scenarios; having the mobile device
resting in the user’s hand, on a table, or within the
user’s pocket.
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Figure 5: System Overview of EchoLock.
A Samsung Galaxy Note 5 was used to conduct the
experiment. Due to its relatively large size, the com-
pressing forces acted upon it are more pronounced as
the sound propagation is prolonged by traveling through
a larger medium. An inaudible chirp signal sweeping
from 16 kHz to 22 kHz was emitted from the device
speakers to induce vibration, which is then recorded by
a single microphone near the top of the device. This
captured recording is then examined for features that
may identify environmental origins. The results of these
experiments can be seen in Figure 4. Three samples
from each use case in Figure 3 were obtained and the av-
erage amplitude for each recording was extracted. The
absolute difference was then computed for each com-
bination of samples to measure statistical distinction
between each use case.
Our findings show a clear relation between samples
originating from different use cases. Samples native
to the same use case displayed naturally low ampli-
tude difference, which increased when compared to sam-
ples from foreign cases. Note across the diagonal that
the difference is zero as these are comparisons between
a sample with itself. This suggests that, even with
minimal sensors and signal processing, structural-borne
sound propagation is capable of communicating critical
information about the immediate surroundings.
4. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
EchoLock utilizes the properties of sound wave prop-
agation to identify mobile device users, which can be
applied to applications such as accessing banking ac-
counts, managing notifications, and unlocking devices.
In this section, we introduce the application of acoustic
sensing to deduce the identity of the person holding the
mobile device via structure-borne sound propagation,
the attack model, and system overview.
4.1 Attack Model
Impersonation Attack. The attacker attempts to
mimic the holding posture of the legitimate user to gain
access to the device. For impersonation attacks, the at-
tacker may either be informed or uninformed. In the
uninformed case, the attacker possesses no knowledge
on how to circumvent the identification process and
naively attempts to mimic the legitimate user’s holding
behavior. In the informed case, however, the attacker is
explicitly aware of the legitimate user’s authentication
credentials in some form. This may be through pas-
sive observations of the user’s hands or interactions such
as handshaking. Physically faking the legitimate user’s
profile, however, requires applying forces to the device
such that they create structural deformations similar to
how the user’s own hands would.
Eavesdropping and Replay Attack. The attacker
attempts to steal acoustic credentials of the legitimate
user by eavesdropping instances of identification attempts.
This may be done by positioning a microphone near the
user as EchoLock is deployed. After obtaining an au-
dio sample of a signal used to authenticate the user,
the attacker gains possession of the targeted device and
replays the audio sample via an external speaker. Dur-
ing ultrasonic sensing, the mobile device will transmit
and record our acoustic signal. Successful replay of an
eavesdropped sample necessitates the attacker to first
suppress or prevent this signal to avoid overlapping with
their own transmission, which is a non-trivial challenge.
Jamming Attack. The attacker in this scenario is
focused on deliberate sabotage of genuine authentica-
tion attempts. This may be carried out by playing loud
noise or ultrasonic frequencies near the user to disrupt
the profile estimation procedure. The attacker does not
necessarily need to know the user’s credentials to jam
the system. We assume in our assessment that the at-
tacker will utilize ultrasonic frequencies to decrease the
chances of detection by the ordinary user.
4.2 Challenges and Requirements
Although the results from our feasibility study are en-
couraging, they also highlight critical design challenges.
First, using a single built-in speaker and a microphone
available on a mobile device to sense the user’s compli-
cated physical hand traits (e.g., hand geometry, finger
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placements and holding strength) is an unexplored area.
Second, because the acoustic signals travel too fast com-
pared to the small dimensions (i.e., sensing area) of mo-
bile devices (e.g., 15 cm between a built-in speaker and
microphone for a smartphone), the existing built-in mi-
crophone can only receive limited acoustic samples (<
20 samples [30, 35]) to describe a complete propaga-
tion. Using such limited acoustic information to de-
scribe the complicated interferences caused by people’s
hand is difficult. Third, the acoustic signals arriving at
the microphone are the combination of structure-borne
propagation and airborne propagation; how to separate
or leverage these propagation signals to extract peo-
ple’s hand biometrics is challenging. Fourth, the en-
vironmental reflections of the acoustic sensing signals
and the ambient noises corrupt the received sound and
make the acoustic analysis of the user’s holding hand
even harder. Besides addressing these challenges, we
also need to consider both security and usability when
designing the system. In particular, the passive user in-
put to our system should be hard to observe and imitate
to meet security requirements. Moreover, our system
needs to have a short acoustic sensing period to avoid
causing additional delay and support the user’s both
left hand and right hand to maintain high usability.
4.3 System Architecture
We designed EchoLock as a fast and low effort user
authentication scheme using existing hardware compo-
nents to detect and process structure-borne sound waves.
In order to authenticate a user’s identity from these
sound waves, we perform an acoustic signal preprocess-
ing phase and a learning-based mobile device holder
identification process as illustrated in Figure 5. Echo-
Lock uses the Pickup Detection to continuously monitor
an initiating action, such as the user picking up their
device from a table or pocket, with the assumed intent
that the user wishes to unlock the device. Upon de-
tection of this action, our system performs Ultrasonic
Sensing, where the device’s speaker briefly emits an in-
audible acoustic signal (i.e., a chirp signal ranging from
18kHz to 22kHz) and immediately after records the
user’s reflection via onboard microphones. This proce-
dure concludes within milliseconds, depending on signal
design parameters we discuss in Section 6.1.
Then, this response undergoes our Acoustic Signal
Preprocessing phase, where we apply a bandpass filter
from 18kHz to 22kHz and perform cross-correlation to
remove noise and ensure that our obtained signal con-
sists of structure-borne sound. Following the prepro-
cessing, the system analyzes the signal to capture the
user’s physiological and behavioral characteristics in the
Acoustic-based Physiological and Behavioral Biometrics
Derivation. A series of statistical and frequency based
features, further elaborated in Section 5, are identified
based on their sensitivity to the forces, palm sizes and
Figure 6: Structure-borne, near surface airborne
sounds and environmental reflections.
finger displacements of the user’s hand and selected by
KNN-based Feature Selection.
These features are used to develop our learning-based
classifiers, which are responsible for processes we refer
to as profiling and verification. All extracted features
representative of a specific user are compiled into a cell-
based data structure and saved to a database of Acous-
tic Sensing-based User Hand Profile. This database is
then referenced for a profile match when performing the
user authentication. However, even known users may
be difficult to verify due to behavioral inconsistencies
in how they hold their devices. To combat this, we em-
ploy the Learning-based Classifiers Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM) and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA)
learning techniques to examine numerical distance dis-
crepancies and deduce the most probable user profile
match. Once complete, EchoLock finally concludes the
process with an identification decision, performing a de-
sired function, such as unlocking the device or denying
access, based on the computed similarities between the
measured features obtained from ultrasonic sensing and
database of learned profiles. Because of the rapid prop-
agation of sound through a physical medium, the entire
process is conducted within milliseconds without any
conscious exertions from the user.
5. LOW EFFORT IDENTIFICATION
5.1 Sound Propagation Separation
When a user holds his or her mobile device, EchoLock
utilizes the device’s speaker and microphone to send and
receive acoustic sensing signals, which can capture the
user’s fine-grained hand biometrics. This is because the
holding hand interacts (i.e. block and reflect) with the
acoustic signals and creates unique patterns associated
with the holding hand’s physical characteristics, includ-
ing the curvature and fat composition of the palm.
Intuitively, the structure-borne propagation of the
acoustic signals is a good candidate for deriving the
user’s hand biometrics, since the structure-borne signals
are directly affected by the contacting area and force of
the hand holding the mobile device. However, extract-
6
Figure 7: Illustration of the time-domain statis-
tical features to differentiate two people’s hands.
ing the structure-borne signals only is non-trivial be-
cause the built-in microphone captures both structure-
borne and airborne signals. Existing studies propose to
leverage the difference between the propagation speed
of the structure-borne signal and that of the airborne
signal to separate them [30, 35]. Due to the small di-
mensions of mobile devices, the structure-borne signal
only arrives at a very short time before the airborne
signals (e.g., 0.20ms).
In particular, the acoustic signals propagating along
the paths close to surface of the mobile device may be
blocked or reflected by the user’s holding hand. Figure 6
shows the structure-borne and near surface airborne sig-
nals when a smartphone is placed on a table and held
by a hand, respectively, when playing and recording a
1ms short chirp signal using the built-in speaker and
microphone.
It is apparent that both structure-borne and near sur-
face borne signals are affected significantly by a hand,
however airborne sound is less reliable to estimate sur-
rounding information due to distortions from the mul-
tipath effect. The minute delay of airborne sound may
also introduce noise to subsequent structure-borne sound
transmissions due to asynchronous arrival time, neces-
sitating separation of the two. We note that while air-
borne sound is not directly used by our system to iden-
tify the user, it does provide an indirect masking effect
against eavesdropping attempts by obscuring genuine
structure-borne sound to external listeners.
5.2 Acoustic Feature Extraction
After receiving the designated signal, the system ex-
tracts from it unique features to analyze the interfer-
ences caused by the user’s hand and derive a biometric
profile, which integrates both physiological and behav-
ioral traits. A series of candidate features are identified
for their potential responsiveness to different user hand
biometrics. These features include statistical proper-
ties in the time domain, the spectral points in the fre-
quency domain, and acoustic properties such as Mel-
Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) and Chroma-
gram features.
Time-domain Statistic Features. In the time do-
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Figure 8: Spectral analysis of the received acous-
tic signal for two people’s holding hands.
main, we choose to analyze signals by its statistics in-
cluding mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum,
range, kurtosis and skewness. We also estimate the sig-
nal’s distribution by calculating second quantile, third
quantile, fourth quantile and signal dispersion. Addi-
tionally, we examine peak change by deriving the index
position of the data point that deviates most signifi-
cantly from the statistical average. Figure 7 shows an
example of the features with the standard deviation, sig-
nal dispersion, and range of the received acoustic signal,
illustrating the statistical features can effectively differ-
entiate the user’s holding hand.
Frequency-based Features. In the frequency do-
main, we apply Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) to
the received acoustic signal and derive 256 spectral points
to capture the unique characteristics of the user’s hold-
ing hand in the frequency domain. This is because the
holding hand can be considered as a filter, which results
in suppressing some frequencies while not affecting oth-
ers. Figure 8 shows an example of the received sound
in the frequency domain, where the frequencies between
19kHz and 21kHz are affected by the user significantly.
Acoustic Features. We also derive the acoustic fea-
tures from the received sound using the MFCC [22] and
Chromagram [24]. MFCC features are normally applied
in speech processing studies to describe the short-term
power spectrum of the speech sound and are good for
reflecting both the linear and non-linear properties of
the sound’s dynamics. Chromagram, often referred to
as ”pitch class profiles”, is traditionally utilized to an-
alyze the harmonic and melodic characteristics of mu-
sic and categorize the music pitches into twelve cate-
gories. We have observed the sensitivity of the MFCC
and Chromagram to be sensitive enough to respond to
physical biometrics as well. In this work, we derive 13
MFCC features and 12 chroma-based features to de-
scribe the different hand holding-related interferences
to the sound.
5.3 KNN-based Feature Selection
Some features are more sensitive to the minute dif-
ferences of different hands while the others may not be
very effective at distinguishing between them. More-
over, mobile devices from different vendors may have
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Figure 9: Euclidean distance of the standard de-
viation feature for two users relative to a sepa-
rate instance of the feature for the second user.
their speaker and microphone embedded at different po-
sitions. These hardware distinctions introduce further
uncertainty when measuring the user using our features.
In this work, we develop a K-nearest neighbour (KNN)
based feature selection method find the more salient fea-
tures for EchoLock according to the mobile device when
the user registers the system.
In particular, we apply KNN to each type of feature
to obtain the clusters for different users. We then cal-
culate the Euclidean distance of each feature point to
its cluster centroid and that to centroids of other clus-
ters. The purpose is to calculate the intra-cluster and
inter-cluster distances to measure whether a feature is
consistent for the same user and simultaneously distinct
for different users. Next, we divide the average intra-
cluster distance over the average inter-cluster distance
and utilize an experimental threshold to select the fea-
tures. The selected features based on KNN are not only
sensitive to the user’ hand holding activity but also re-
silient to the other factors such as acoustic noises.
5.4 Learning-based Holder Verification
We develop learning-based algorithms to learn the
unique characteristics of the user’s hand holding ac-
tivity based on the derived acoustic sensing features
and determine whether the current device holder is the
legitimate user or not. In particular, we utilize Sup-
port Vector Machines (SVM) and Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA) as two alternative classifiers to classify
the mobile device holder a registered or unknown user.
SVM relies on a hyperplane to divide the input acoustic
sensing feature space into the categories with each rep-
resenting a user. The hyperplane is determined during
the training phase with the acoustic sensing data from
the registered users. We use LIBSVM with a linear ker-
nel to build the SVM classifier [9]. LDA finds a linear
combination of features that characterizes or discrimi-
nate the acoustic sensing data in different user classes
and utilizes Bayes’ theorem for classification.
The classifiers are trained during the user profile con-
struction phase that is detailed in Section 6.3. During
the user verification phase, Echolock first classifies the
testing data to one user based on the user profile. Then,
our algorithm utilizes the prediction probabilities re-
turned by the classifier as a confidence level and applies
a threshold-based method to examine the classification
results. If the confidence level of the classification is
above the threshold, the user is identified. Otherwise,
our system will determine it as “unknown” and respond
accordingly. This can be used for multiple applications,
such as immediately adjusting user settings when a reg-
istered user is detected, or locking devices when an un-
known user attempts to gain access.
6. IMPLEMENTATION
6.1 Acoustic Sensing Signal Design
The specific design of the acoustic signal emitted is
paramount to the performance of EchoLock. Conse-
quentially, measuring biometric properties of a given
person accurately using only sound propagation requires
our signal to satisfy several design criteria:
• The signal must be designed in such a way to easily
distinguish between the structure-borne and airborne
sound propagation.
• The transmitted signal should be recognizable such
that it can be easily identified and segmented amid
interference from ambient noise and other acoustic
disruptions. This is doubly advantageous for user
identification as the procedure should be as fast as
possible to avoid inconveniencing the user.
• The signal should fall within a safe frequency range
inaudible to average human hearing. This is primar-
ily for the purpose of usability as a noticeably au-
dible signal may pose a nuisance to some users if
they are subjected to it every time they wish to ver-
ify their identity. Generally speaking, 16kHz is the
upper bound of easily detectable sound for ordinary
adults [6].
• The signal must be able to be deployed on a COTS de-
vice, limiting the viable transmission frequency range.
Android devices, for example, are reported to have a
maximum sampling rate of around 44kHz, limiting a
practical signal to 22kHz at most [16]. Many devices,
however, exhibit considerable attenuation problems
when transmitting frequencies exceeding 20kHz due
to hardware imperfections in onboard speakers [30,
34, 35, 41]. However, EchoLock actually leverages
this property as a means of security as these hard-
ware imperfections introduce variability that is con-
sistent with the device origin, making it difficult for
attacking signals to trigger false-positive results due
to the challenges of mimicking degradation specific to
a particular device.
With these considerations, we choose a chirp signal
sweeping from 18kHz to 22kHz. This chirp consists of
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Figure 10: Signal segmentation on a microphone
recording containing the desired acoustic fea-
tures.
1200 samples, equating to a 25ms duration at a 48kHz
sampling frequency. During ultrasonic sensing, the recorded
structure-borne propagation of the chirp signal will be
imbedded with information on the user’s hand geome-
try. While a shorter signal minimizes exposure to en-
vironmental reflections, it also limits the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR). To balance these two considerations, we
transmit a series of consecutive chirps, separated by
25ms of empty buffers to stagger the arrival of airborne
reflections from structure-borne sound. We refer to this
design as a n-chirp sequence where n is the number of
repeating chirps in the signal used during implementa-
tion. By utilizing multiple chirps, we can also gather
multiple user samples in a single ultrasonic sensing in-
stance. This leads to a natural tradeoff dilemma be-
tween higher classification accuracy and shorter time
delays. We show in further detail the performance ac-
curacy for increasingly large n values in Section 7.4.
6.2 Noise Removal and Signal Segmentation
As described previously in Section 3, structure-borne
sound propagation is capable of conveying information
representative of the surrounding environment. In order
to extract this information, it is necessary to remove the
interference generated by various sources (i.e. irregular
vibration patterns and ambient background noise) and
determine the precise segments of the acoustic signal
containing the target structural sound pattern. A naive
assertion could be made suggesting that the system can
be designed to transmit and recapture the sound in a
synchronized time interval based on the speed of sound
through a physical medium. Not only does this strategy
disregard the minute, unpredictable time delays intro-
duced as a result of multiple layers of hardware and
software operations, it also requires precise knowledge
regarding the positioning of speakers and microphones
relative to each other, as well as the particular mate-
rial the device is constructed from. These conditions
are neither consistent nor easy to acquire across mul-
tiple devices, thus a more reliable procedure must be
developed.
Noise Removal. Thanks to the design of our acous-
tic sensing signal, we can separate our transmission from
interference by using a band-pass filter. In particular,
we design a band-pass filter with the pass band through
18kHz to 22kHz, which is the expected frequency range
of the transmitted chirp signal. We apply a Butterworth
low-pass and high-pass filter at the specified frequencies
to achieve this.
Signal Segmentation. After noise filtering, we need
to identify the precise segment containing the structure-
borne sound. This can be accomplished by using cross-
correlation to locate similarities between the recorded
acoustic signal with the original transmission. Figure
10 shows the acoustic signal before and after the pro-
posed noise removal and signal segmentation, using a
volunteer holding a Samsung Galaxy Note 5 as an ex-
ample. The figure demonstrates that the acoustic signal
received is filtered and and truncated to contain only
the desired frequency range of the signal transmitted,
suggesting that our methods can successfully remove
noises and precisely extract the information containing
the user’s hand characteristics.
6.3 User Profile Construction
EchoLock requires the user to provide the training
data for user profile construction during registration.
The acoustic sensing signals are emitted during this pro-
cess, and the acoustic sensing features (in Section 5.2)
are derived and labeled to train the learning-based clas-
sifier as described in Section 5.4. An existing data set of
anonymized user profiles is included to serve as negative
labels when classifying the user during identification at-
tempts. Registering multiple users to the same device
also serves to expand this data set. To ensure robust-
ness and low false negative rates, the user is advised
to vary holding behavior multiple times rather than re-
main still to train the data. This can be verified using
motion sensors to detect change in device holding pos-
ture.
7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
7.1 Experimental Setup
We study the performance of EchoLock in a variety
of common use case scenarios as well as on several mo-
bile devices. Our experiments test the capability of our
system to lock or unlock access to mobile devices as an
example application, approved by our institute IRB. We
present our findings and detailed analysis below.
Experimental Setup. A prototype application for
EchoLock was developed for use on Android devices.
Three Android devices, the Google Nexus 5, Galaxy
Note 5, and Galaxy Tab A, were selected for their var-
ied designs (e.g., speaker and microphone positions)
and size discrepancies, pictured in Figure 11. Both the
Nexus 5 and Galaxy Note 5 devices include two onboard
microphones whereas the Galaxy Tab A is equipped
with one. Two types of environments explored were of-
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Figure 11: Mobile device specifications and lo-
cations of key sensor components.
fice and public settings. Office settings consist of quiet,
enclosed spaces with minimal disturbances whereas pub-
lic settings are locations with large volumes of people
and traffic. We maintain an average noise level of ap-
proximately 30dB and 60dB for the two environments,
respectively. Sources of noise for the public environment
include nearby conversations, walking, and dining. We
gauge the ability of our system to accurately identify
the user in the face of these obstacles. Additionally,
we also investigate the impact of accessories that may
transform the properties of the user’s hand or device
structure, such as gloves or smartphone cases (exam-
ples in Appendix). From these identified factors, we
devised several scenarios to study.
Data Collection. 8 use case experiments were de-
vised in total, divided into 3 general categories. The
first and second categories study performance differ-
ences across device models and surrounding noise levels,
respectively, comprised of the Cartesian product of our
3 devices and 2 environmental conditions. The third
category considers usage via indirect physical contact,
which includes when the user has equipped a protec-
tive case to their device and when the user is wearing
a glove while holding their device. To reduce the num-
ber of factors at play during our third category of tests,
we confine our study to the Galaxy Note 5 device in
office settings. No specific instruction was provided to
the participants on how to hold the device to encour-
age more natural interactions. However, we find that
almost all participants favored holding postures similar
to those shown in Figure 11. This is both beneficial
and challenging as this adds consistency to our data set
while also making it less simple to differentiate usage
behaviors. We recruit 20 volunteers, 14 males and 6
females ranging from ages 18-35, to participate in our
study. We collect 40 n-chirp sequences, where n=10, for
each test case based on the procedure in Section 6.3 for
a total of 64,000 hand geometry samples. The profiles of
all volunteers collectively act as the negative label dur-
ing classification, with the exception of the target user
undergoing identification. Our data collection process
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Figure 12: Confusion matrix of user identifica-
tion when deploying EchoLock on the Nexus 5.
spanned a 2 month period with volunteers providing
data across different days. While this data is used for
user identification purposes, we do not consider it to be
personally identifiable information (as mentioned in Ta-
ble 1). Nonetheless, we are currently maintaining this
data privately and do not plan to release it publicly as
a precaution.
7.2 Evaluation Metrics
We describe the accuracy of our system by evaluating
two criteria from our results, precision and recall. Pre-
cision is defined as the percentage of True Positive (TP)
classifications out of all positive classifications recorded,
notated as P = TPTP+FP where FP is the false positive
rate. Recall is defined as R = TPTP+FN or the percentage
of true positive classifications out of all target class in-
stances. For our purposes, higher precision describes
lower probability for different people to be mistaken
for the legitimate user while higher recall describes the
lower probability that the legitimate user is misidenti-
fied as someone else.
7.3 User Identification Performance
From our signal processing procedures, we obtain sev-
eral features used to identify the user and present them
to a machine learning classifier for authentication. To
evaluate the performance of our implementation, we
consider Decision Trees (DT), Linear Discriminant Anal-
ysis (LDA), K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), and Support
Vector Machines (SVM) as our candidate classifiers.
Figure 12 shows an example confusion matrix demon-
strating user identification accuracy for a group of 20
users in office settings. From our initial comparisons of
each classifier’s ability to distinguish between 5 different
users, we observe LDA and SVM to demonstrate rea-
sonable validation, showing accuracy of 95% and 91%,
respectively, and smaller range compared to DT and
KNN. As a result, we present our findings for these two
classifiers for our extended evaluations. We choose 10-
fold cross-validation during the training process to best
utilize our data set and minimize selective bias, allocat-
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Figure 13: Performance for different mobile de-
vice models when used in office and public set-
tings.
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Figure 14: Performance when identifying users
in different environments.
ing 50% for training and the remaining 50% for testing.
7.4 Impact Factor Study
Impact of Device Models. We consider the perfor-
mance discrepancies when operating EchoLock on dif-
ferent mobile devices. Our participants are provided
devices with our prototype installed and given a short
explanation on its functionality. We note that a single
demonstration less than 10 seconds long is sufficient for
our participants to grasp how to operate EchoLock, in-
dicating its ease of use. We graph P and R in Figure 13
for the Nexus 5, Galaxy Note 5, and Tab A usage in
office and public settings, and observe precision rates
of 91%, 90%, and 81%, respectively, when classified us-
ing our LDA classifier. When evaluated using our SVM
classifier, we find precision rates of 94%, 80%, and 69%,
again respectively. Similar trends follow for recall rates.
We note that performance can be correlated to the size
of the device used, as users more easily acclimate to a
favored posture for smaller devices compared to larger
devices. We refer to these results, particularly for the
Galaxy Note 5, as a benchmark of other experiments.
Impact of Environmental Noises. Figure 14 shows
performance differences when considering the surround-
ing environments during user authentication. The intro-
duction of significant ambient noise produces a notice-
able effect on accuracy, showing precision decline from
84% to 78% in the case of SVM and 92% to 81% for
LDA. Our smartphone devices showed greater resilience
under these conditions compared to our tablet device.
We suspect this is attributed to the lack of secondary
microphones on the Tab A device, which limits noise-
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Figure 15: Performance when using the mobile
device through direct vs. indirect physical con-
tact. Results shown are for the Galaxy Note 5.
cancellation capabilities compared to the smartphone
devices. While interference from sources such as people
walking or adjusting chairs caused an expected decrease
in accuracy, we have found that loud vocalizations pro-
duced more significant performance degradation. We
attribute this to our acoustic features, specifically our
usage of MFCC. As MFCCs are most commonly used
in speech processing, the presence of loud voices nearby
causes our biometric measurements to be overwritten
by the more dominant speech characteristics.
Indirect Physical Contact. We also consider the
influence of factors that may transform properties of ei-
ther the device or user’s hand when using EchoLock.
Figure 15 shows our results for usage during situations
where the user’s hand does not directly make contact
with the mobile device. To simulate these conditions,
we equip our Galaxy Note 5 device with a smartphone
case to change the physical properties of the medium.
We also provide wool gloves roughly 2mm thick for the
user to wear during separate sets of experiments. We
conduct our tests under office settings and compare to
previously observed performance. Our findings do not
show statistically significant deterioration for these con-
ditions tested. On the contrary, some users showed
slightly improved accuracy ranging from 1-3%, partic-
ularly when wearing gloves. We suggest that the mate-
rial of the gloves conformed well to the curvature of the
hand while simultaneously suppressing certain variance
in grip behavior, such as minor fidgeting or twitching.
Impact of Embedded Microphone Location. For
devices with more than a single onboard microphone,
quality of identification can vary noticeably. Figure 16
shows an example of two microphones’ ability to dis-
tinguish separate people based on features extracted
from their recordings. Structure-borne sound originat-
ing from the bottom speaker will be considerably damp-
ened by the force of the user squeezing the device when
received by the bottom microphone. For the top mi-
crophone, this sound is more strongly influenced by the
positioning of the thumb and fingers, which shapes the
signal as it decays due to the longer distance traveled.
When evaluated using 100 samples provided from 5 peo-
ple, we observe identification accuracy of 96% and 61%
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Figure 16: Classification accuracy for two avail-
able microphones based on signal transmission
from a bottom-positioned speaker.
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Figure 17: Performance of EchoLock as length
of n-chirp sequence increases.
for the top and bottom microphones, respectively. The
comparatively less accurate rate for the bottom micro-
phone is attributed to the shorter path from the source
speaker to the receiving microphone, preventing suffi-
cient vibration and feature formation. This stipulates
that our speaker and microphone must be orientated
further apart such that they encompass as much of
the device as possible for optimal measurement. As
such, we compute our results using data provided from
speaker and microphone pairs with the greatest amount
of separation when an option to select exists.
N-Chirp Sequence Length. We investigate the ef-
fect of chirp sequence length on identification accuracy
as a consideration to improve performance, shown in
Figure 17. While increasing the size of n used for sens-
ing naturally enhances accuracy, we observe an onset of
diminishing returns rapidly after roughly 5 iterations.
Stability around 90% can be maintained for n values
as low as 3 in optimal test cases (i.e. smaller devices,
quiet settings). As mentioned in Section 6.1, a single
chirp iteration requires only 25ms, or 50ms when ac-
counting for buffering between iterations, meaning that
our current performance can be feasibly achieved in exe-
cution times competitive with techniques such as finger-
printing. These results also indicate that an individual’s
hand biometrics are recognizable such that our classi-
fiers may begin to identify them with moderate success
using a relatively small number of training samples.
7.5 Attacks on User Credentials
Impersonation Attacks. We evaluate the possibil-
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Figure 18: Performance of user identification
during evaluation of impersonation and eaves-
dropping/replay attacks.
ity of potential attackers to impersonate hand profiles
of other users as a means of gaining unauthorized ac-
cess to devices and information. For our assessment,
we consider the worst case scenario; a limited (i.e. 5)
training sample size for the victim user and multiple
informed attackers. 20 participants first observe an in-
stance of the designated victim using our hardware plat-
forms and given 10 attempts to imitate their hold for
each device. We measure the True Positive (TP) and
False Positive (FP) rates and plot the ROC curve in
Figure 18(a), showing FP rates as low as 6% for a 90%
TP rate for devices such as the Nexus 5. These re-
sults suggest that observation alone is not sufficient to
impersonate another hand profile; success is dependent
on physical similarity between the attacker and victim,
which the attacker cannot control.
Eavesdropping and Replay Attacks. We assessed
the viability of eavesdropping information by during our
studies on standard usage behavior. Figure 19 shows an
example configuration of hardware during these exper-
iments. One of our mobile devices acts as a malicious
sensor, listening for the validating signal used to iden-
tify the user. Filtered signals recovered from these sim-
ulated attacks in an office setting showed recognizable
chirp patterns, as depicted in Figure 20, however clar-
ity is lost due to the multipath effect. In trials with 10
users, 9 acting as victims and 1 as an attacker, directly
replaying these recordings failed to grant the attacker
access to the victim’s device in all instances, depicted
in Figure 18(b). Recorded signals must travel through
two airborne paths, once from the victim device to the
eavesdropper and vice versa, causing significant atten-
uation and loss of genuine structure-borne properties.
Sophisticated attackers may attempt to apply noise can-
cellation and amplification to minimize attenuation, but
careless processing of this signal risks destroying embed-
ded features used to validate the user.
8. DISCUSSION
Optimal Scenarios for Classifiers. Our findings
show situational advantages for employing SVM and
12
Figure 19: Example attack model setup.
LDA classifiers for user identification. Figures 13 and 14
indicate that both the device model and surrounding en-
vironments contribute significantly to the performance
of EchoLock. These results indicate that our LDA clas-
sifier is more platform-agnostic, showing less than 1%
precision and recall difference for different smartphones
and under 10% difference between smartphones and tablets.
In contrast, we note that SVM is less susceptible to
change in performance as a result of additional back-
ground noise, showing an average 6% difference between
office and public spaces compared to 11% for LDA.
These findings are intuitive to the nature of their respec-
tive classifiers as the linearity of LDA is suited for situ-
ations with consistency (i.e. a quiet space with devices
and hand geometry that do not change) whereas the in-
troduction of unpredictable factors requires adaptabil-
ity offered by techniques such as SVM.
Jamming Attacks. We also consider the possibil-
ity of acoustic disruptions to our performance via jam-
ming strategies. To do so, we study the ability for 10
users to use our system when an attacking device plays
a continuous signal within the operational frequency of
EchoLock. Figure 21 shows examples of the frequency
domain during these experiments. We play an attack-
ing signal continuously sweeping from 18kHz to 22kHz
during ten identification attempts per user at a dis-
tance of 0.2m. We find that detection of these jamming
signals is feasible using a threshold scheme. We note
that although detection is possible, negating the inter-
ference still poses a challenge. However, jamming at-
tempts from distances greater than 1m were observed to
lose potency, functioning more similar to public environ-
ment conditions described in Section 7.4. Methods to
avoid threshold detection may attempt to limit the ex-
tent they exceed normal intensity, however this requires
careful synchronization on the scale of milliseconds. Ad-
ditionally, the jamming signal must match the length of
the n-chirp sequence, which the attacker cannot predict.
We are further improving resistance to these attacks as
part of our future work.
Potential Hardware Constraints. During our se-
lection of candidate devices to experiment on, we be-
came aware of certain hardware configurations unsuit-
able to implement EchoLock on (e.g. speakers on front
(a) Signal on vic-
tim device
(b) Eavesdropped
signal
(c) Replayed signal
observed by victim
Figure 20: Frequency clarity throughout eaves-
dropping and replay attack 0.2m from victim.
(a) Frequency domain under
ordinary usage
(b) Frequency domain under
jamming attack
Figure 21: Identification of jamming attempts
within the system operational frequency range.
face, microphone on back). We determine that our im-
plementation necessitates our hardware components to
be orientated such that they are as distant from each
other as possible to allow for uninterrupted sound prop-
agation, which cannot be accurately measured with a
backward-facing microphone. Adherence to this may
be somewhat relaxed by leveraging gyroscopic measure-
ments to compensate for inconvenient speaker or mi-
crophone placement, though this also adds additional
hardware requirements to an intentionally minimalist
design.
9. CONCLUSION
We have proposed EchoLock, an inexpensive, non-
intrusive, and lightweight identification protocol deploy-
able on commodity mobile devices or smart IoT devices.
Our system validates the user’s identity using a novel
technique leveraging acoustic sensing of structure-borne
sound propagation to ascertain biometric characteristics
based on how the user holds their devices. A prototype
of EchoLock has been implemented on multiple Android
platforms and evaluated in key use case scenarios. Our
identification technique is quick to conduct, low effort to
use, and demonstrates accuracy over 90%. Our current
prototype evaluates EchoLock as a standalone identifi-
cation protocol; for future work, we intend to integrate
it with existing authentication techniques and assess the
possibility of elevating current security rates. Further-
more, we intend to also enhance our ability to defend
against more sophisticated attack models. While we
have demonstrated EchoLock on select mobile devices,
we are also exploring other hardware options and de-
veloping a more robust implementation to realize high
13
accuracy, low effort identification.
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APPENDIX
(a) Glove equipped (b) Protective case
Figure 22: Considerations for device usage
through indirect physical contact. Protective
case is detached for visual clarity.
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